Liquefied natural gas (LNG) is natural gas cooled to about −162 °C until it condenses into a cryogenic liquid, at which point it occupies roughly one six-hundredth of the volume it takes up as a gas. That single fact is what makes it possible to move energy across oceans: gas that cannot be piped economically from Qatar to Japan, or from Texas to Germany, can be liquefied, shipped in insulated tanks and turned back into gas at the far end. Everything else about the industry — the trains, the tankers, the terminals, the contracts and the arguments about emissions — follows from the physics and the cost of fighting it.[1][2]
Why liquefy, and what it costs
Natural gas is mostly methane, with ethane, propane and heavier fractions in smaller amounts. Cooling it below its boiling point at near-atmospheric pressure turns it into a clear, colourless liquid that can be stored in insulated tanks and carried in ships. The trade-off is energy: liquefaction is an extremely intensive process, consuming somewhere between 7% and 15% of the gas delivered to the terminal, and the whole chain — liquefy, ship, regasify — adds cost and emissions at every step. LNG is therefore a way of monetising stranded gas and connecting distant markets, not a free upgrade on a pipeline.[3]
The chain, and the engineering that makes it work
At the export end, gas is treated to remove water, carbon dioxide, sulphur compounds and heavy hydrocarbons, then chilled in cryogenic heat exchangers until it liquefies. At the import end, terminals store it in insulated tanks and warm it back to gas in vaporisers before sending it into pipelines. In between, the cargo rides in double-hulled ships whose containment systems must hold a liquid at −162 °C while the hull moves through ocean swell — a materials problem as much as a refrigeration one, since the tank has to accommodate thermal contraction, sloshing loads and fatigue over a twenty-year life.[4]
Two containment families dominate. Membrane systems, about 79% of the fleet, bond a thin corrugated metal barrier — stainless steel in the Mark III design, Invar alloy in NO96 — to insulation fixed to the inner hull, so the hull itself carries the structural load. Self-supporting Moss systems, about 21%, use free-standing aluminium spheres held on a cylindrical skirt; the spheres are visible above deck and are structurally independent of the hull. No insulation is perfect, so some cargo always boils off: modern ships achieve boil-off rates below 0.10% of cargo volume per day, against around 0.15% in older vessels, and the gas is either burned as fuel or reliquefied.[5][6]
The market in 2025
GIIGNL’s 2026 annual report records a record year: global trade of 428 million tonnes in 2025, up 5% on 406 MT in 2024, driven by a new wave of Atlantic Basin supply and a sharp rebound in European demand. Asia remained the largest importing region at 271 MT, or 63% of the total, but contracted by 4% — almost entirely because Chinese imports fell 15% to 67 MT as Russian pipeline deliveries and domestic production displaced LNG. Europe was the engine of growth, importing 126 MT, up 29%, after the end of Russian gas transit through Ukraine, low storage entering the year and a 12% rise in power-sector gas consumption; the United States supplied 58% of that volume. The Middle East and Africa grew fastest in percentage terms, up 60% to 18.2 MT, mostly on Egypt’s return to imports.[7]
On the supply side the United States consolidated its position as the largest exporter at 109 MT, a jump of 24 MT powered by the ramp-up of Plaquemines LNG and four new trains at Corpus Christi Stage 3. Qatar remained close behind at 80.5 MT and Australia at 78.8 MT. Four projects added 33 MTPA of liquefaction in the year — LNG Canada’s first two trains, Corpus Christi Stage 3, Plaquemines Phase 1 and the Greater Tortue Ahmeyim floating plant — taking global nominal capacity to 524 MTPA, including 16.5 MTPA afloat. Regasification capacity reached 1,247 MTPA, and the carrier fleet grew 8% to 899 vessels. Two facts in the report matter commercially: 35% of all trade moved on a spot basis, and 24 countries exported to 48 import markets.[8][9]
LNG used to be a business of twenty-year contracts and dedicated ships. A third of it now moves on spot cargoes, which means the market clears more like a commodity and less like an infrastructure project.
India’s position
India is a structural importer with an unusual profile. Natural gas makes up only about 6% of the country’s primary energy mix against a global average of roughly 23–24%, and India consumed about 189 MMSCMD of gas in FY 2025–26, down from 195 MMSCMD the previous year, with imported LNG supplying about 51.5% of demand. LNG imports fell to 26.0 million tonnes from 27 million tonnes, as consumption declined in fertiliser, power and refining while city gas distribution grew. Fertiliser remains the largest user at about 28% of gas, city gas distribution about 24%, and power only about 12%.[10][11]
The infrastructure problem is more interesting than the demand one. India has about 57.7 MMTPA of regasification capacity, with roughly 15 MMTPA more under construction. But the capacity is wildly unevenly used: Petronet’s Dahej terminal, now expanded to 22.5 MMTPA, ran at about 92% of its old nameplate in FY 2025–26, while the other seven terminals — Hazira, Dhamra, Dabhol, Kochi, Ennore, Mundra and Chhara — used roughly a quarter of theirs between them, leaving about 26 MMTPA idle. HPCL’s Chhara managed 6.2%. Analysts attribute this less to weak demand than to a system built in silos, where each terminal was sized for its owner’s portfolio, four compete for the same Gujarat hinterland, and spare slots rarely left the company that held them. A platform for trading idle terminal capacity is now being tested against that explanation.[12][13]
The government’s target is to raise gas to 15% of the energy mix by 2030, which on Petronet’s own arithmetic would require about 150 MMTPA of regasification running at 80% utilisation — roughly 80 MMTPA more than exists today, and LNG imports of over 100 million tonnes a year against about 25 now.[14][15]
The emissions question
LNG is cleaner than coal at the point of combustion and much cleaner than oil for local air quality, but its climate case depends on the whole chain, and the chain leaks. The IEA’s 2026 assessment puts the global average emissions intensity of LNG from production through regasification at about 18.6 g CO2-equivalent per megajoule delivered — a figure that varies widely by field, plant and shipping route, and that gives buyers a basis for discriminating between cargoes rather than treating all LNG as equivalent.[16]
The sharpest issue is methane slip — unburnt methane escaping from LNG-fuelled engines. Methane has roughly 28 times the warming effect of carbon dioxide over a century and about 85 times over twenty years, so small leakage rates matter enormously. On a hundred-year basis the climate advantage of an LNG-fuelled ship disappears once slip approaches about 4%, and beyond that the vessel can be worse than a conventionally fuelled one. Default factors used for reporting vary by engine type — about 3.5% for dual-fuel medium-speed Otto engines under IMO rules, 1.7% for slow-speed Otto, 0.15% for diesel-cycle dual-fuel — and field measurements have found averages well above the defaults on some low-pressure four-stroke engines, at 6.4%. High-pressure two-stroke designs are now achieving slip below 0.2 g/kWh.[17][18]
Regulation has caught up with the measurement. The EU’s FuelEU Maritime regulation has applied since January 2025 and brings methane and nitrous oxide into shipping’s greenhouse gas accounting; methane emissions from 2026 must be fully accounted for in the 2027 EU ETS compliance cycle, with the UK scheme extending to maritime in July 2026. The practical effect is to reward engines and operating profiles that minimise slip, and to make default emission factors a commercial variable rather than a paperwork formality.[19][20]
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